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cially propitious occasion for taking stock of his-and, by extension, the "new" history's-achievement.
In Birth, Morris definitively shatters one of the most enduring myths about the origins of the Israeli-Arab conflict-but only to substitute another that is scarcely more credible in its place.
The aim of Morris's study is to explain why roughly 700,000 Palestinians fled their homes in the wake of the November 1947 United Nations General Assembly Resolution supporting the creation of an Arab and Jewish state in Mandatory Palestine. 4 The book's central thesis is that neither of the standard accounts of the Palestinians' exodus can withstand close scholarly scrutiny: the Zionists did not expel them with premeditation, as the Arabs allege, and the invading Arab states did not urge them to leave, as the Zionists allege. The truth, as Morris sees it, rather lies "in the vast middle ground" between these two extremes:
The Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. It was largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterised the first Israeli-Arab war; in smaller part, it was the deliberate creation of Jewish and Arab military commanders and politicians. (1948, p. 88; Birth, p. 286) Morris further asserts that, under the given circumstances-i.e., mutual fear and hostility, war, and so on-the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem was "almost inevitable." (Birth, p. 286)
The results of Morris's research thus apparently belie the most damaging Arab claims5 and exonerate Israel of any real culpability for the catastrophe that befell Palestine's indigenous population in 1948. 6 While these conclusions will not satisfy those among Israel's partisans who will accept nothing but Arab culpability, they nevertheless substitute a new version of what occurred in 1948 which as well requires judicious analysis.
In this essay I will argue that Morris has substituted a new myth, one of the "happy median," for the old. My contention will be that the evidence Morris adduces does not support his temperate conclusions and that the truth lies very much closer to the Arab extreme.7 Specifically, I will argue that Morris's central thesis that the Arab refugee problem was "born of war, not by design" is belied by his own evidence which shows that Palestine's Arabs were expelled systematically and with premeditation.
"Born of War, Not y Design"?
Morris maintains that the Palestinian Arab refugee problem was "largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterised the first Israeli-Arab war." Simply put, it was "born of war, not by design." Yet, in a note to Birth, Morris suggests a rather significant qualification of this view:
The world "expelled" was often used rather loosely by Israelis in 1948. It was quite often assumed by non-witnesses that a given community had been expelled when in fact it had left before Israeli forces arrived. The desire to see the Arabs leave often triggered the assumption that commanders-who it was presumed shared this desire-had had to act overtly and directly to obtain this result, when this had not been the case. But i denial of the right to return was aform of "expulsion, " then a great many villagers-who had waited near their villagesfor the battle to die down before trying to return home-can be considered "expellees." (p. 343, note 7; emphasis added) Thus, Morris agrees that, in at least one crucial sense, "a great many" Palestinian refugees were systematically expelled from their homes. This then raises the questions of whether the Zionists intended that the Arabs flee from their homes and whether they acted in a manner consonant with this intention. If the answer to these two questions is also in the affirmative, then it becomes impossible to sustain Morris's thesis that the refugee problem was "born of war, not by design." One could maintain that, given the armed hostilities, the Zionists had no alternative except to expel the indigenous Arab population; but one could not still maintain that the Arab flight was an unintended or unanticipated "by-product" of the war.
Before turning to the evidence in this regard, it is not without interest to consider the Arab estimate of Zionist intentions on the eve of the war. Morris cites a British report on the conference of Arab prime ministers in December 1947, in which the Arab view of Zionist ambitions was summarized as follows:
The ultimate aim of all the Zionists was "the acquisition of all of Palestine, all Transjordan and possibly some tracts in Southern Lebanon and Southern Syria." The Zionist "politicians," after taking control of the country, would at first treat the Arabs "nicely." But then, once feeling "strong enough," they would begin "squeezing the Arab population off their lands ... [and] if necessary out of the State." Later, they would expand the Jewish state at the expense of the Palestinian Arab state. However, the most militant Haganah commanders wished to move more quickly.... Exploiting the weakness and disorganization of the Arabs, they would first render them-especially in Jaffa and Haifa-"completely powerless" and then frighten or force them into leaving, "their places being taken by Jewish immigrants." The Arab leaders . . . thought that there existed a still more extreme Jewish plan, of the Revisionists, calling for more immediate expansion. (Birth, p. 24) For all the monumental corruption and incompetence of the Arab leaders, one cannot but be impressed by the prescience of their analyses. Curiously, Morris virtually admits as much but, in a peculiar turn of phrase, describes these Arab "prognoses" as "in the nature of self-fulfilling prophecies." (Birth, p. 24) If he means that the Arabs, by electing to wage war, facilitated the expulsion, he is no doubt correct. Yet, this in no way belies the fact that it was an expulsion.
The Arab flight from Palestine divides into basically two stages, the first covering the period from the 29 November 1947 UN General Assembly resolution to the Israeli independence declaration in May 1948, and the second covering the period from June 1948 to the signing of the armistice agreements in mid-1949. I will deal with each of these stages in turn.
November 1947-May 1948
For the period preceding Israel's birth, Morris focuses primarily on the months April and May. Morris's central conclusion reads as follows:
The main wave of the Arab exodus, encompassing 200,000-300,000 refugees, was not the result of a general, predetermined Yishuv policy. The Arab exodus of April-May caught the Yishuv leadership, including the authors of Plan D, by surprise, though it was immediately seen as a phenomenon to be exploited. (Birth, p. 128) This conclusion incorporates three claims, none of which, in my opinion, can sustain close scrutiny: 1) April-May 1948 witnessed "the main wave of the Arab exodus," 2) the Arab exodus was "not the result of a general, predetermined Yishuv policy," and 3) the Arab exodus during these months "caught the Yishuv leadership, including the authors of Plan D, by surprise." Of these five waves, he reports that the "main wave" unfolded April-May 1948, as "the bulk of the Palestinian refugees-some 250,000-300,000-went into exile." Morris devotes by far the largest chapter of his study ("The second wave: the mass exodus, April-June 1948") to the Arab exodus during these months.8 The unmistakable inference is that this wave is somehow representative. Indeed, Morris describes the events in Haifa during April and May as "illustrative of the complexity of the exodus." (1948, p. 18) Yet, Morris's periodization obscures the fact that Israel's statehood declaration was actually the watershed date. In the weeks immediately preceding 14 May, the Zionist leadership was especially sensitive to international pressure because of threats (emanating particularly from the United States) to rescind or modify the partition resolution. This concern for world public opinion acted to some extent as a brake on Zionist policy vis-a-vis the Palestinian Arabs. As Avi Shlaim puts it in Collusion Across the Jordan:
The flight of the Palestinian Arabs [in April 1948] served the military needs of the Yishuv but endangered its international position. A major contention of official Zionist propaganda was that peaceful relations between Arabs and Jews were possible, and Ben-Gurion himself repeatedly declared a Jewish-Arab alliance to be one of the three main objectives of his policy. Any sign of deterioration, any incident liable to plunge Palestine into a bloodbath, naturally, encouraged the opponents of partition. (pp. 164-65) In the wake of Israel's declaration of independence, however, this constraint was to a large extent (but not altogether) lifted. Coupled with a new military context (the invasion and subsequent rout of the Arab armies), this diplomatic breakthrough enabled the Zionists to pursue with virtual impunity a policy that, as we shall see presently, was openly and relentlessly bent on expulsion. At least as many, and probably more, Arabs fled after Israel's statehood declaration as before (for the various estimates, cf. Birth, p. 292; 1948, pp. 30, 72, 88; Flapan, p. 89). What happened in, say, April is thus not exactly "illustrative of the complexity of the exodus." Morris himself concedes this point in another context, observing that the "circumstances of the second half of the [Arab] exodus" from June onward were "a different story." (1948, p. 88) In effect, the overt expulsion of Lydda's Arabs in July was no less representative of Zionist policy than the covert expulsion of Haifa's Arabs in April. Nevertheless, as I will argue presently, Zionist policy throughout was one of expulsion.
2) The Arab exodus was "not the result of a general, predetennined Yishuv policy." Morris's argument is that no single factor can explain the flight of the Palestinian Arabs during this period:
There is probably no accounting for the mass exodus . . . without understanding the prevalence and depth of the general sense of collapse, of "falling apart," that permeated Arab Palestine, especially the towns, by April 1948. In many places, it would take very little to induce the inhabitants to pack up and flee. Come the Haganah (and IZL-LHI) offensives of AprilMay, the cumulative effect of the fears, deprivations, abandonment and depredations of the previous months, in both towns and villages, overcame the natural, basic reluctance to abandon home and property and go into exile. As Palestinian military power was swiftly and dramatically demolished and the Haganah demonstrated almost unchallenged superiority in successive conquests, Arab morale cracked, giving way to general blind panic or a "psychosis of flight," as one IDF intelligence report put it. (Birth, p. 287)
The correlative of this argument is that the Arab exodus did not result from a systematic policy of expulsion. Yet the evidence Morris brings to bear in support of his thesis points to a different conclusion. In this section I will look at general Zionist policy and in the next section I will focus on two key architects of Zionist policy during these months.
According to Morris, the Yishuv military leadership formulated in early March and began implementing in April Plan Dalet to cope with the anticipated Arab offensives. The "essence" of Plan D "was the clearing of hostile and potentially hostile forces out of the interior of the prospective territory of the Jewish State.... As the Arab irregulars were based and quartered in the villages, and as the militias of many villages were participating in the antiYishuv hostilities, the Haganah regarded most of the villages as actively orpoten- In accordance with Plan D, the Haganah and dissident Zionist groups launched a series of military offensives, the fully anticipated result of which was the Arabs' flight from Palestine. The attacks themselves were "the most important single factor in the exodus of April-June from both the cities and from the villages. . . . This is demonstrated clearly by the fact that each exodus occurred during and in the immediate wake of each military assault. No town was abandoned by the bulk of its population before Jewish attack." (Birth, pp. 130-31, emphasis in original; cf. 1948, pp. 74-77) The widely publicized slaughter at Dayr Yasin, the massacres in Khirbet Nasr ad Din near Tiberias and 'Ein az Zeitun near Safad, the indiscriminate and protracted mortarings in Haifa"' and Acre, the use of loudspeakers broadcasting "black propaganda" (i.e., terrifying) messages in Arabic, crop burnings, and so on, spurred into exile those Palestinians not sufficiently impressed by the lightning assaults of the Zionist forces. (1948: pp. 71, 75-76, 173-90 passim) Especially outside the major urban centers, "it was standard Haganah and IDF policy to round up and expel the remaining villagers (usually old people, widows, cripples) from sites already evacuated by most of their inhabitants." (Birth, p. 288) Finally, Morris reports that the Arab exodus during these months was "certainly viewed favorably" and "with satisfaction" by "the bulk of the Yishuv's leadership." (1948, p. 87) Given that the expressed aim of the wartime de facto Zionist leadership was to expel the Arabs, given that its intention became operative policy in the field, given that the tactics of the Jewish commanders had the predictable result of inducing a mass flight, and given that Palestinians who fled the scene of battle were blocked from returning to their homes once hostilities were suspended, not too much significance would seem to attach to Morris's observation-itself questionable, as we shall see below-that expulsion orders were rarely issued "since most of the villages were completely or almost completely empty by the time they were occupied." (Birth, p. 131)
Morris does acknowledge that the "atrocity factor" (his phrase) played a major role in certain areas of the country in encouraging Arab flight. ( Much ink has been spilled on the mass Arab exodus from Haifa in late April.12 There is no need to rehearse all the specific arguments here. For our purposes, the important point is that events in Haifa generally conformed to the pattern of terror, assault, and expulsion described above. Intercommunal strife in Haifa first peaked in December 1947 with an unprovoked attack by Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) members on a crowd of Arab refinery workers. By April, some 15,000-20,000 of Haifa's 70,000-strong Palestinian community had already fled the city, as hostilities continued to escalate. In accordance with Plan D, the Haganah launched its major offensive against Haifa on 21 April. Attacking Jewish forces made liberal use of psychological warfare and terror tactics. We have already noted the terrible scene near the port area. (Cf. note 4) Jeeps were also brought in broadcasting recorded "horror sounds"-including "shrieks, wails and anguished moans of Arab women, the wail of sirens and the clang of fire-alarm bells, interrupted by a sepulchral voice calling out in Arabic: Save your souls, all ye faithful! Flee for your lives!," according to the eyewitness account of a Haganah officerand threats to use poison gas and atomic weapons against the Arabs. something else altogether." (Birth, p. 90) With only several thousand Arabs remaining, certain Zionist authorities did finally make a serious effort to halt the exodus, apparently for fear of diplomatic repercussions and the serious strains in the Haifa economy that the flight of Arab workers would cause. 13 Watching the Arabs flee, Ben-Gurion, who visited the city on 1 May, reportedly exclaimed, "What a beautiful sight!" (Palumbo, p. 76) Learning that one Zionist official in the city was trying to persuade the Arabs to stay, Ben-Gurion remarked, "Doesn't he have anything more important to do?" (Birth, p. 328, note 4) The policy he announced was to treat the remaining Arabs "with civil and human equality" but "it is not our job to worry about the return of the Arabs [who fled]." (Birth, p. 133) In July, Haifa's remaining inhabitants, some 3,500, were packed into a ghetto in the downtown Wadi Nisnas neighborhood. (1948, pp. 149-71) Morris maintains that "there is no evidence that the architects of, and commanders involved in, the offensive of 21-22 April hoped that it would lead to an Arab evacuation of Haifa." He goes on to observe that "at the level of Carmeli Brigade headquarters, no orders were ever issued to the troops dispersed in the Arab districts to act in a manner that would precipitate flight." (Birth: pp. 85, 92; cf. 1948, p. 84) Yet Morris himself so qualifies these claims as to render them at best trivial. First, we are told that "clearly the Haganah was not averse to seeing the Arabs evacuate" Haifa. (Birth, p. 86) We next learn that, notwithstanding Carmeli headquarters orders-issued "somewhat belatedly"-that forbade looting and urged the Arabs to remain calm and return to work, "if not explicitly to stay in the city," there was "certainly an undercurrent of more militant thinking akin to the IZL approach."
At the company and platoon levels, officers and men cannot but have been struck by the thought that the steady Arab exodus was "good for the Jews" and must be encouraged to assure the security of "Jewish" Haifa. In short, defacto Zionist policy, even at the level of the Carmeli Brigade headquarters, was to press the Arab exodus from Haifa. Thus, Milstein observes that, notwithstanding the Zionists' claim that they "wanted the Arabs to stay in Haifa, but the Arabs refused," the "truth was different: The commander of the Carmeli Brigade, Moshe Carmel, feared that many Arabs would remain in the city. Hence, he ordered that three-inch mortars be used to shell the Arab crowds on the market square. The crowd broke into the port, pushing aside the policemen who guarded the gate, stormed the boats and fled the city. The whole day mortars continued to shell the city, even though the Arabs did not fight." ("No deportation, evacuation") Indeed, the "great efficacy" of these "indirect methods" (among others) in Haifa is singled out by the important IDF intelligence report of June 1948 in its recommendations for precipitating Arab flight. (1948, p. 71) 14 The other Arab cities and the Arab villages besieged during the months April-May met roughly the same fate as Haifa-and for roughly the same reasons. The aim of Operation Yiftah, commanded by Yigal Allon, was to "clear" the Eastern Galilee border area "completely of all Arab forces and inhabitants." Thus were Safad and the villages of Fir'im and Mughr al-Khayt emptied of their inhabitants. (Birth, pp. 101-2, 121-22) The aim of Operation Ben-Ami, commanded by Moshe Carmel, was "the conquest and evaluation by the Arabs" of the Western Galilee. Carmel's operational order of 19 May to his battalion commanders read: "To attack in order to conquer, to kill among the men, to destroy and burn the villages of Al Kabri, Umm al Faraj and An Nahr." (Birth, pp. 124-25) The aim of Operation Lightning, commanded by Shimon Avidan, was to cause a "general panic" and "the wandering [i.e., exodus]" of the Arabs in the south, bordering Egypt. (Birth, p. 126) The villagers of Kaufakha in the Negev had, according to Morris, "earlier repeatedly asked to surrender, accept Jewish rule and be allowed to stay, all to no avail. The Haganah always regarded such requests as either insincere or unreliable." (Birth, p. 128; emphasis added) Even villages that had "traditionally been friendly towards the Yishuv"-for example, Huj, whose inhabitants had hidden Haganah men from a British dragnet in 1946 and whose mukhtar was shot dead by a mob in Gaza because of his "collaboration with the Jews"-were depopulated and destroyed. (Birth, p. 128)
The record Morris has assembled evidently belies his central thesis that the vicissitudes of war, not an expulsion policy, accounted for the flight of Palestine's Arabs during these months. Yet it is not only Morris's evidence that works against his thesis; his own arguments work against it as well.
Morris asserts that, although right-wing Revisionist Zionists like Menahem Begin and the Irgun leadership did not "openly espouse a policy of expulsion" during April and May, the goal was "manifest" in the nature of the attacks they led. He elaborates on this point in a revealing footnote worth quoting at length:
While Begin and the IZL leadership were careful not to openly espouse a policy of expulsion, it is clear that the IZL's military operations were designed with the aim of clearing out the Arab inhabitants of the areas they 3) The Arab exodus during the months April-May "caught the Yishuv leadership, including the authors of Plan D, by surprise." Morris maintains not only that the Palestinian exodus was an unintended "by-product" of the war but that it "surprised"-indeed, "shocked," "flustered," and "astonished" It is very possible that in the coming six or eight or ten months of the war there will take place great changes . . . and not all of them to our detriment. Certainly there will be great changes in the composition of the population of the country." (Birth, p. 52; Tikkun, p. 83; 1948, pp. 40, 90; Milstein, "No deportations, evacuation") When asked at this same Mapai meeting about the absence of Jewishowned land in strategic areas of Palestine, Ben-Gurion replied: "The war will give us the land. the concepts of 'ours' and 'not ours' are only concepts for peacetime, and during war they lose all their meaning." (Birth, p. 170) Indeed, throughout this month, he repeatedly expressed his intention to appropriate Arab lands in the course of the upcoming war; for example, he suggested to Weitz on 10 February that Weitz divest himself of "conventional notions.... In the Negev we will not buy land. We will conquer it. You are forgetting that we are at war." (Birth, p. 170) Morris comments on this latter exchange:
Of course, Ben-Gurion was thinking ahead-and not only about the Negev. Morris evidently fails to draw the obvious inference that, "as Ben-Gurion saw things" already in early February, resolving the Jewish state's massive and seemingly intractable "land problem" would have to entail the dispossession and displacement of the indigenous Arab peasants. Thus, on the eve of the Haganah offensive resulting in the Arab exodus which allegedly "surprised" Ben-Gurion, the latter anticipated that the Zionists would "enter the empty [Arab] villages and settle in them." (Birth, p. 180; emphasis added) Morris observes that Ben-Gurion then outlined "two major characteristics of the settlement drive of the following months: settlement of the abandoned Arab villages and settlement in areas thinly populated by Jews." (Birth, pp. 180-81; emphasis added) Two days later, on 6 April, Ben-Gurion added:
We will not be able to win the war if we do not, during the war, populate Upper and Lower, Eastern and Western Galilee, the Negev and the Jerusalem area, even if only in an artificial way, in a military way.... I believe the war will also bring in its wake a great change in the distribution of the Arab population. The weight of the evidence overwhelmingly points to the conclusion that, at least so far as the "flight of the Arabs" is concerned, this was not an idle boast. (Curiously, Morris does not report Ben-Gurion's claim that the Arab flight didn't come as a surprise to him.) '6 After citing Ben-Gurion's eager anticipation in February 1948 that "there will certainly be great changes in the composition of the country," Morris asks rhetorically: "Are these the words of a man who wishes to see the Arabs remain 'citizens of a future Jewish State'? Or are these, rather, the words of a leader who has long entertained . . . a concept of 'transfer' as the solution to the prospective Jewish state's Arab problem?" One may just as well ask rhe-torically: Are these the words-is the record that Moris has assembled-of a man who was "shocked" by the Arab flight?
Let us niow turn to Yosef Weitz. Weitz was the Jewish National Fund executive responsible for land acquisition and its allocation to Jewish settlements, and the JNF representative on the Committee of Directorates of the National Institutions, and on the Settlement Committee of the National Institutions. As Morris comments, he "was well placed to shape and influence decision-making regarding the Arab population on the national level and to oversee implementation of policy on the local level." (1948, p. 91) '7 As far back as 1940, the idea of a massive Arab transfer from Palestine had "gripped the imagination" of Weitz. (Birth, p. 27; cf. Palumbo, p. 4) And, already in early 1948, Weitz-like Ben-Gurion-grasped that the "state of anarchy created by the hostilities" could and should be used to solve the "Arab problem" in Palestine. (1948, pp. 91, 120) In an 11 January diary entry, he wrote: "Is it not now the time to be rid of them? Why continue to keep in our midst these thorns at a time when they pose a danger to us? Our people are weighing up With the implementation of Plan D in April, the Zionist leadership in effect undertook to accomplish exactly what Weitz had, in the preceding months, repeatedly urged and already by himself attempted-i.e., to exploit the conditions of "war and anarchy" to expel the Arabs. Given Weitz's clitical place in the Zionist apparatus and his personal foreknowledge of the likely consequences of a massive and bloody assault on the Arab population, it is hard to believe that the ensuing mass exodus came as much of a "surprise" to him.
Indeed, consider the following suggestive incident reported by Morrms. On 13 April, Israel Galili, the Haganah chief, wrote Weitz: "We regard as important to security new settlements being established in the following places ...: Beit Mashir, Saris, Ghuweir, Abu Shusha, Kafr Misr, Khirbet Manshiya, Tantura, Bureir." Galili asked that the establishment of the settlements at these sites be carried out "as soon In the first place, the fact that Weitz was not at first privy to the specific unfolding of events in Haifa scarcely proves that the overall Arab flight came as a surprise to him. Furthermore, Weitz quickly recovered his bearings. The very same day that his "innards" were being eaten away by "fears" and the day before his "unconscious" was being "frightened" by the Arab exodus, Weitz was already urging that the flight-prone "state of mind" of Haifa's Arabs be "exploited" in order to "hound the rest of the inhabitants so that they should not surrender [and then stay put]. We must establish our state. cannot be explained." (Birth, p. 111; emphasis added) And, Morris, whose credulity apparently also knows no limits, credits these remarks without even the slightest demurral. '9 Thanks in no small part to Weitz's lobbying efforts, the Arab flight from Palestine was fast becoming afait accompli by the summer of 1948. In midJune, the "decision against a return" had more or less "crystallized." (1948, p. 186) Weitz now spearheaded an unofficial and then in August an official "transfer committee" to prevent the repatriation of the Arab refugees. In this capacity, he supervised the destruction of, or resettlement of Jews in, the abandoned Arab villages. (For details, see chapter 4-5 of Birth and chapter 4 of 1948.) Morris observes that the "great majority" of the Jewish settlements (including the kibbutzim) and officials supported these policies. (Birth, pp.
167-68)
The decision to block repatriation of the Arab refugees coincided with Israel's embarkment on a headlong expulsion policy, to which I will return presently. Before doing so, however, I want to take note of a curiosity in Morris's argument.
We have seen that there is precious little evidence that the Arab flight from Palestine came as a "shock" to the wartime Zionist leadership. Yet there is ample evidence that a crucial component of the Yishuv believed the wartime Zionist leadership was engaged in a policy of mass expulsion. This component was Mapam, the United Workers Party.
Mapam was unusually well placed to follow the unfolding of events in 1948. Much of the Haganah/IDF's officer corps was recruited from Mapam-e.g., Galili, Carmel, Rabin, and Allon. Moreover, committed as it was to achieving a modus vivendi with the Arab world, Mapam enjoyed atypically close relations with the Palestinian Arabs. Finally, Hashomer Hatzair, which together with Ahdut Ha'avodah formed Mapam in January 1948, managed to accumulate an extensive archive on the Arab flight. Now, according to Morris, the "majority opinion" in Mapam throughout 1948 was that Ben-Gurion's policy was "tending toward expulsion." A debate did ensue in Mapam on the Arab exodus, but this debate generally assumed that the Arabs were being expelled: the only real question was whether politics or the exigencies of combat inspired Ben-Gurion's "war of expulsion." Morris dutifully reports all this without comment. He impeaches neither the motives nor the testimony of the Mapam leaders. Yet Morris never once confronts the question begging to be asked: If the Arab flight was "born of war, not by design," where did the Mapam leaders get such strange ideas? June 1948 -July 1949 Until the end of April, the Zionist leadership was very sensitive to diplomatic opinion. The international consensus that favored partition in November 1947 seemed to be on the brink of collapse. If the Zionists embarked on a course too openly hostile to the indigenous Arab population, it would have supplied the perfect pretext for those parties eager to preempt the founding of a Jewish state. As the fourteenth of May approached, however, these fears abated and the Zionists' anti-Arab policies became more pronounced. The state was now an irrevocable fact. Furthermore, the Arab invasion could justify an expulsion policy; and, as the IDF progressed from strategic offensive to rout beginning in early July, such a policy could be relentlessly pursued with total impunity. Within the next eleven months, fully half of the total Palestinian population that ultimately found itself in exile took flight.
According to Morris, although "there was no Cabinet or IDF General Stafflevel decision to expel" the Arabs, "from July onward, there was a growing readiness in the IDF units" to do exactly that. (Birth, p. 292; cf. Birth, p. 218) Ben-Gurion himself left no doubt during these months that he "wanted as few Arabs as possible to remain in the Jewish State. He hoped to see them flee. He said as much to his colleagues and aides in meetings in August, September, and October." (Birth, pp. 292-93) Indeed, already in July he was openly complaining to the Northern Front chief of operations that too many Arabs had remained in newly conquered Nazareth: "Whty did you not expel them?" (Tikkun, p. 82) On 26 September, Israel's first prime minister assured his cabinet that, during the next offensive, the Galilee would become "clean" and "empty" of Arabs. On 21 October, he declared that " [t] he Arabs of the Land of Israel have only one function left to them-to run away." Describing the Arab exodus from Galilee ten days later, Ben-Gurion commented, "and many more still will flee"-to which Morris adds: "It was an assessment-and, perhaps, hope-shared . . . at the time by many key figures in the Israeli military and civil bureaucracies." (Birth, p. 218) Certain exceptions were made to this now overt expulsion policy-notably, Druze and Christian Arabs were for various reasons not forced into flight (Birth, pp. 198-202)20-but, generally, it was executed with ruthless efficiency. For example, in Operation Yoav (as in all IDF offensives during these months), "bombers and fighter bombers, battalions of field artillery and mortars, and tanks" were "deployed with telling effect." The Arabs who failed to flee before the Zionist juggernaut were expelled outright. (Birth, pp.
219-22)
Atrocities escalated, "no doubt precipitat[ing] the flight of communities on the path of the IDF advance." (Birth, p. 230) Consider the massacre at Ad Dawayima in late October. A soldier eyewitness described how the IDF, capturing the village "without a fight," first "killed about 80-100 [male] Arabs, women and children. The children they killed by breaking their heads with sticks. There was not a house without dead." The remaining Arabs were then closed off in houses "without food and water," as the village was systematically razed. "One commander ordered a sapper to put two old women in a certain house ... and to blow up the house with them. The sapper refused.... The commander then ordered his men to put in the old women and the evil deed was done. One soldier boasted that he had raped a woman and then shot her. One woman, with a newborn baby in her arms, was employed to clear the courtyard where the soldiers ate. She worked a day or two. In the end they shot her and her baby." The soldier eyewitness concluded that "cultured officers . .. had turned into base murderers and this not in the heat of battle . .. but out of a system of expulsion and destruction. The less Arabs remained-the better. This principle is the political motor for the expulsions and the atrocities. We have seen that, already during the first weeks of hostilities, Ben-Gurion and his lieutenants were intent on expelling the Arabs from Palestine. The tactics deployed in the successive offensives by the Zionist military forces were tailor-made to achieve this end. As the fourteenth of May approached, and with the majority of the Arabs who eventually became refugees still in situ, the fully fury of the Zionist military machine was unleashed. Palestinians who fled the field of attack, even if lingering right outside their villages or towns until the terror abated, were blocked from returning. Palestinians who lagged behind or failed to "get the message" were generally expelled outright. The villages that were home to these Palestinians were systematically razed.24 Thus, to distinguish between the Palestinian refugees who fled before the attacking (or approaching) Zionist forces, on the one hand, and the Palestinian refugees who were expelled outright, on the other, is, to put it most charitably, an exercise in sophistry. Occasionally, Morris comes close to conceding this point,25 but I don't think he goes nearly far enough. Indeed he couldn't without abandoning his central thesis in the same breath.
Yet even if, for the sake of argument, we were to credit this disingenuous distinction, Morris's account of the Arab flight is still highly misleading-or, at best, inconsistent. Consider the incongruity between his text and sources, on the one hand, and the tables he assembles at the front of Birth, on the other.
These tables purport to give a synoptic view of the Arab flight from Palestine. Each of the roughly 370 Palestinian villages and towns ultimately depopulated is labelled mainly according to whether the inhabitants fled because of Arab orders ("A"), Zionist military assault ("M"), or Zionist expulsion ("E"). Although Morris admits that the line between categories is "occasionally blurred" (Birth, p. xiv), he nonetheless apparently strives to achieve a high degree of precision. Thus, although Morris himself refers without qualification to the "expulsion" of the Arab population of Lydda and Ramle in July,26 in his tables the exodus from these two cities is attributed to expulsion ("E") and military assault ("M"), presumably because some Arabs fled as the IDF was approaching. The reasonable inference is that, wherever more than one factor contributed to the flight (however unequally), both factors are tabulated.
In accordance with Morris's central thesis, flight from the overwhelming number of Arab villages and town listed is attributed solely to Zionist military assault (or fear of such an assault), with flight from only a sprinkling of towns and villages being explained by Arab orders or Zionist expulsions. Morris's tables thus conform with his preference for the "happy median."
Morris's tables are similar to the ones found in an important June 1948 IDF intelligence report, "The Emigration of the Arabs of Palestine." Morris faults this IDF report mainly for "minimiz[ing] the role direct expulsion orders played in bringing about the Palestinian exodus." (1948, p. 84) Ironically, Morris's tables are in this respect identically flawed. In effect, Morris's tables may conform with his preference for the "happy median," but they do not conform even with his own findings or the sources he lists. Here I can only sample the record.27
Morris reports that the IDF document erred in not also assigning an "E" classification to Khirbet Lid (al-Awadim), Fajja, Al Khalisa, As Salihiya, and Beisan (Beit Shean), since expulsion did play a part in the Arab flight from these sites. (1948 pp. 83-84) Yet in Morris's own tables, not one of them is listed with an "E" classification.
Morris reports that in early 1948 Joseph Weitz first "initiated or prompted the expulsion" of Arabs from Jewish-owned land, and then shifted his focus to "large areas, such as the Beit Shean Valley, Westem Galilee, and Ramot-Menashe," where he was again "instrumental in emptying [them] of their Arab population." (1948, pp. 141-12) Yet of the roughly one hundred Arab villages and towns Morris lists for these areas, onlyfour are given an "E" classification.
Morris reports that the Arab villagers of Beit Naqquba were given "strong advice" by the IDF to leave. Subsequently, a "handful" were allowed back to live in a neighboring Arab village. (1948, p. 192ff .) Yet in his tables Beit Naqquba is listed with an "M." (Even more curiously, Morris includes Beit Naqquba in a chapter of 1948 devoted to Arab villages that remained in situ.) Likewise, Morris reports that the Arab villagers of Jaba, 'Ein Ghazal, and Ijzim "fled and/or [were] driven out." (The official Israeli account of Arab flight was disputed by UN observers who found evidence of expulsion.) (1948, p. 212; Birth, pp. 213-14) Yet in Morris's charts, not one of these villages receives an "E" classification. And again, Morris reports that the IDF "carried out a full-scale clearing operation in the Kaufakha-Al Muharraqa area" during which "the villages' inhabitants and [Bedouini concentrations in the area were dispersed and expelled" (Birth, p. 215; the second quote is from an official Israeli source). Yet in the text, Al Muharraqa-Kaufakha receives only an "M" classification.
Morris reports that Palmah units entering Abu Zureiq "took some 15 adult males and some 200 women and children" captive and "sent" the women and children towards Jenin. (Birth, p. 117) Yet in Morris's tables, Abu Zureiq receives only an "M" classification. Likewise Morris reports that at As Sindiyana, "the mukhtar and his family and some 300 inhabitants stayed put and raised a white flag. They were apparently expelled eastwards." (Birth, p. 117) Yet, in Morris's tables, As Sindiyana receives only an "M" classification. And again, Morris reports that the IDF "arrested some of the villagers" in Qatra, and "within a few days, either intimidated the rest of the villagers into leaving or ordered them to leave." (Birth, p. 126) Yet in Morris's tables, Qatra receives only an "M" classification. And still again, Morris reports that the "last major wave of evictions" in the Galilee in mid-1949 caused a public scandal as the remaining inhabitants of three formerly cooperative Arab villages-Khisas, Qeitiya, Ja'una-were brutally expelled south of Safad. (Birth, p. 242) Yet not one of these villages receives an "E" classification in Morris' tables.
Morris reports that a Haganah raid "precipitated the evacuation of . .. Al Manara." (Birth, p. 70) In the tables, the village is listed with an "M." The only source Morris cites is Naffez Nazzal, The Palestinian Exodusfrom Galilee, 1947-1949.28 Turning to Nazzal, we read that "Zionist soldiers attacked ... El Manara (a village of 490 Arab inhabitants), chased its inhabitants out, destroyed some houses, and left leaflets behind warning the inhabitants not to return because the village had been mined." (pp.28-29) Morris reports that a Haganah force "captured the village of Khirbet Nasir ad Din.... Some non-combatants were apparently killed and some houses destroyed. Most of the population fled to Lubiya or to Tiberias. . . . Several dozen villagers remained in situ." (Birth, p. 71) In the tables, Nasir ad Din receives three classifications, none of which is an "E." The main source cited by Morris is Nazzal. Turning to Nazzal, we read that "Zionists attacked the . . . village of Nasr-ed-Din (with 90 Arab inhabitants) and destroyed all its houses, killing some of its inhabitants, including women and children, and expelling all the rest." (p. 29) Morris reports that "[w]hile most of 'Ein az Zeitun's young adult males fled. . ., some of the village women, children and old men stayed put. These were apparently rounded up ... and expelled." (Birth, p. 102) In the tables, 'Ein az Zeitun is listed only with an "M." The only source Morris cites is Nazzal. Turning to Nazzal, we read that, although the armed villagers fled, "[a]lmost all the old men, women and children remained in the village because the villagers had previously agreed among themselves not to leave." They were all subsequently expelled. (pp. 33-37)
Morris concludes his discussion of the IDF report that the observation that "only a small proportion" of the Arab exodus can be accounted for by direct or even indirect expulsion. (1948, p. 88) This reckoning perhaps has less to do with the facts than with Morris's idiosyncratic bookkeeping.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by putting Morris's achievement in perspective. Morris has indisputably produced landmark studies. He has permanently redefined the parameters of legitimate scholarly debate on the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem, dispatching to oblivion the standard Israeli claims about "Arab broadcasts."29 Indeed, Morris's devastating reply to Shabtai Teveth's recent defense of these claims can only be described as a virtuoso performance (cf. the Commentary and Tikkun articles cited above). Morris has tapped a wealth of archival material which no serious student of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can afford to ignore. In effect, Morris's research will serve as the benchmark for all future scholarship on the topic. Yet Morris's achievement falls well short of the estimable standard he has set himself. In Tikkun, Morris distances himself from "propagandists" such as Professor Edward W. Said. He rather locates his calling as a scholar above the realm of crass political partisanship in the pristine heights of truth and objectivity. Said's sin was to have cited Morris for the claim that "a sequence of Zionist terror and Israeli expulsion . . . was behind the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem." Surely, as I think I have shown, this is a legitimate interpretation of Morris's evidence-if not of his thesis. According to Morris, however, his research shows that "war, without a Jewish masterplan or indeed, without any preplanning whatsoever, brought a Palestinian exodus of itself," and that "with a little nudging in the right direction, the low-key exodus ... turned into a mass flood and a fait accompli." What is this if not official Zionism's "astonishing" flight of Palestine's Arabs now graced with Morris's imprimatur?
In the same Tikkun article, Morris cautions that "the moment the historian looks over his shoulder, begins to calculate how others might utilize his work, and allows this to influence his findings and conclusions, he is well on his way down that slippery slope leading to official history and propaganda." Morris would have done well to heed this caveat as he prepared the results of his research for publication. Mounting operations against enemy population centers located inside or near our defensive system in order to prevent them from being used as bases by an active armed force. These operations can be divided into the following categories:
-Destruction of villages (setting fire to, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris), especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously.
-Mounting combing and control operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the village and conducting a search inside it. In the event of resistance, the armed force must be wiped out and the population must be expelled outside the borders of the state.
10. Cf. Birth, p. 131, where Morris observes that "in general, operational orders in Haganah attacks on both urban and rural targets did not call for the expulsion or eviction of the Arab civilian populations." I take Morris to mean here explicit, written orders. Given what he has already conceded, this is plainly a distinction without a difference. 11. Morris cites a British observer who noted that, during the morning of 22 April, the Haganah was "continually shooting down on all Arabs who moved in Wadi Nisnas and the Old City. This included completely indiscriminate and revolting machinegun fire and sniping on women and children . . . attempting to get out of Haifa through the gates in the dock... There was considerable congestion outside the East Gate These utterances, incidentally, evoked not the slightest demurral from his interlocutor.
(2) Menahem Milson, the highly regarded (at least in the U.S.) professor of Arabic literature at the Hebrew University and former head of the Civil Administration of the West Bank, writes in a liberal Zionist periodical that "the established version of the origins of the refugee problem is on the whole historically correct." This "established version" goes as follows:
Under orders of their leaders, the Arabs left their homes in the towns and villages in the area which was to become Israel. These areas evacuated were those which were or were becoming battle arenas between Arabs and Jews. The reasoning behind these orders, rooted in Arab plans and expectations at the time, was that the Jews would soon be van
